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ABSTRACT
In 2002 more than 18 million low-income individual taxpayers received the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). Despite its size, non-participation in this program is a concern and substantial effort
is devoted by the IRS, local governments and many non-profits to address it. Most of the tax returns
for EITC recipients are filed electronically by paid tax preparers who often charge significant fees
for their services. Using variation across states in the introduction of state electronic filing programs,
we show that the introduction of electronic filing had a significant effect on participation in the
EITC. Our results are robust to accounting for other welfare, EITC and IRS reforms introduced
during the same period. We suggest that this effect is due to the impact that electronic filing
opportunities had on the tax preparation industry, therefore providing an example of how a market-
based approach can be effective in addressing the problem of program non-participation.
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Tax rules and details of welfare programs are diﬃcult to understand for economists, and
even more so for the average taxpayer. The classic “tagging” logic emphasized by Akerlof
(1978) suggests that better targeting of beneﬁts allows for reducing distortions. At the
same time, precise targeting requires specifying precise eligibility criteria thereby increasing
the complexity of rules applying to individuals. As a practical matter, increased complex-
ity makes it diﬃcult for intended recipients to learn about and beneﬁt from government’s
programs; they are also bound to make mistakes and to be unaware of all of their responsi-
bilities. Consequently, increased tagging does not just lead to reduced distortions but also
limits the eﬀectiveness of transfer programs by making them more complex. We provide
empirical evidence, in the context of the Earned Income Tax Credit, that this trade-oﬀ is
endogenous and sensitive to its institutional and technological environment. In particular,
we argue that the market for tax preparation services eﬀectively helps in addressing the
problem of non-participation.
Complexity is often suggested as the reason for reforming the US tax code and it is also
one of the key issues in designing welfare programs. In this paper we focus on a particular
program, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which has attracted a lot of attention
in recent years from both academic and policy circles. While we discuss the evidence and
diﬃculty of measuring non-participation in this program in detail in Section 2.2, the main
puzzle behind the present analysis is that non-participation in the EITC is non-trivial
despite its signiﬁcant advantage over other types of welfare programs. This advantage is
generally attributed to its integration into the income tax system; therefore, individuals
who ﬁle their taxes are likely to be aware of its existence.
In this paper we demonstrate the causal link between the technology of tax compliance
and claiming of EITC beneﬁts. By reducing the time it takes to obtain a refund, the in-
troduction of electronic ﬁling technology constituted a breakthrough in the tax preparation
industry. This change provided tax preparers with the opportunity to provide a new kind
of service: a quick refund. Filing taxes electronically usually required (at least at the lower
end of income distribution) relying on a tax preparer. As the result, the industry was able to
reap beneﬁts of this new technology. At the same time, the additional rents made it worth-
while to expand and reach taxpayers who would otherwise not ﬁle their tax returns. Thus,
our results provide support for and are an example of the possibility discussed by Currie
(2004) in a recent review of the literature on the take up of social programs, that partic-
ipation in such programs can be increased when businesses or individuals have a stake in
promoting them.
More speciﬁcally, we use the staggered introduction of state electronic ﬁling programs
during the 1990’s to show that these state programs had a large eﬀect on the number
of federal electronic ﬁlers as well as the number of EITC claims. Our main identifying
assumption is that once we control for state and year eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc time
1trends, the timing of the introduction of the state electronic ﬁling programs is not correlated
with other factors that might have an eﬀect on our outcome variables. To test the robustness
of our main result, we present a number of speciﬁcation checks that try to account for
possible competing alternative explanations of our results, such as the welfare reform and
state-speciﬁc welfare waivers implemented during this period, IRS programs to reduce EITC
related cheating, or the reform and expansion of EITC in 1991 and 1994. We provide
evidence that this growth cannot be explained by cheating of existing ﬁlers and show that
the bulk of the eﬀect represents increased participation by individuals who previously did
not ﬁle their tax returns (“non-ﬁlers”). While we provide some evidence that these new
ﬁlers of tax returns and EITC beneﬁts are similar among many observable characteristics,
we cannot rule out entirely the possibility that cheaters might drive some of the increase in
participation.
The results suggest a counter-balancing argument to claims that the tax preparation
industry takes advantage of EITC claimants. Tax preparers charge signiﬁcant fees for their
services. Although electronic ﬁling itself very signiﬁcantly reduces the time from ﬁling to
the refund, tax preparers often provide the so-called Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs)
to electronic ﬁlers. These loans have beneﬁts to taxpayers: they amount to receiving their
refund earlier (in some cases, instantaneously) and may relax liquidity constraints. However,
these loans involve little risk1 and given the relatively short time that it takes for the IRS to
process an electronic return, these fees amount in some cases to exorbitant interest rates.2
We do not evaluate the direct welfare beneﬁts and costs of the RALs,3 but our results
suggest that one should not consider RALs out of context: in their presence tax preparers
have an additional incentive to assure that taxpayers apply for the beneﬁts they are due.
As a result, the RALs may be considered to be the price of the (arguably socially beneﬁcial)
market solution to the problem of complexity.4
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We describe the EITC program, changes in tax ﬁling
technology, and the tax preparation industry in Section 2. In Section 3, we present a very
1In fact, tax preparers are even able to verify before they provide a loan whether the taxpayer owes taxes
to the IRS in which case credit would be reduced.
2On the high cost of tax preparation services and RAL loans see Berube et al. (2002) and Wu and Fox
(2003). Berube et al. (2002, page 14) are explicit about the negative welfare impact of the tax preparation
industry: “There is no question, however, that the public interest is not served when a tax credit designed
speciﬁcally to supplement the earnings of low-income workers with children becomes an important proﬁt
center for a multi-billion dollar industry.”
3A baseline economic model suggests that taxpayers who decide to purchase a loan of this kind must
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial. In practice, this is more controversial because the tax preparation industry was accused
of misleading the customers by blurring the distinction between rapid refunds and loans (see “H&R Block
Is Sued by City Over Loan Ads,” New York Times, March 31, 2002.) Implicit in this argument is that
taxpayers have to be unaware of the possibility of receiving a refund quickly (though not as fast as in the
case of RALs) by ﬁling electronically without purchasing a loan.
4We of course do not claim that RALs are the optimal solution. The question of how and if the government
should encourage market solutions intended to increase program participation is an interesting topic for
future research.
2simple model that illustrates how the introduction of electronic ﬁling could have aﬀected
EITC participation. In Section 4, we introduce our data and empirical speciﬁcation. The
main empirical analysis is presented in section 5. We discuss the possible explanations and
interpretations of our results in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 with the discussion of
implications of our results and possible extensions.
2 Earned Income Tax Credit and E-Filing
2.1 EITC
We will only brieﬂy review the main features of the EITC, since Hotz and Scholz (2003)
provide a recent survey on its history and research on this topic. The Earned Income Tax
Credit was introduced in 1975 to provide support for the working poor. The beneﬁts are
phased in for low income workers, held constant in the middle range, and phased out for
the highest eligible incomes. The EITC was expanded between 1991 and 1994. The 1990
EITC expansion was phased in over three years so that in 1993 the maximum beneﬁt was
higher than the 1990 maximum by almost 50% (in real terms). The 1993 budget bill further
expanded the reach of the program by another round of beneﬁts increases, and for the ﬁrst
time, expanded eligibility to childless individuals. EITC beneﬁts vary with the number of
qualifying children. The 1999 (the last year we use in our analysis) maximum for workers
with two or more children was $3,816, with the phase in range between $0 and $9,540 and
the phase out range beginning at $12,460. The credit was fully phased out at $30,580. Since
1994, single individuals are also eligible, however, in 1999 their maximum beneﬁt was just
$347 and the program was fully phased out when income reached $10,200. The Earned
Income Tax Credit is refundable: if the credit exceeds taxpayers’ tax liability, the excess is
payable to the taxpayer.5
In order to claim the credit a taxpayer has to ﬁle a tax return. Taxpayers generally
are not required to ﬁle if their income is below the ﬁling threshold (the sum of standard
deductions and own personal exemptions). If there are dependents, exemptions for them
are not part of the ﬁling thresholds so that the taxpayer may be required to ﬁle even if
there is no income tax liability. Furthermore, there is also a signiﬁcant group of individuals
who do not ﬁle even though they are required to do so (see, Erard and Ho, 2001, for the
discussion).
Although the basic computation of the EITC is straightforward, the eligibility criteria
are not. The major diﬃculty lies in determining whether the taxpayer meets the qualifying
child criteria. Only own children, grandchildren or foster children qualify. A child must be
either under 19 (24 for a full-time student) or be permanently and totally disabled. The
5In 2002, eighteen states have had their own EITC programs. This is a relatively new phenomena: in
1999 there were twelve such states, and in 1990 only ﬁve. We ignore state EITC programs in most of the
paper and provide only some robustness checks that indicate that these programs do not aﬀect our analysis.
3residency test requires that the child lives with the taxpayer for at least half a year in the
case of an own child and the whole year in the case of a foster child. If two diﬀerent taxpayers
are eligible, the one with the higher AGI is supposed to claim the child. The qualifying
child criteria for EITC are diﬀerent from those for child tax credit and tax exemptions.
In fact, it is possible that a taxpayer can claim tax exemption for the child that’s not
a qualifying dependent for the purpose of EITC and vice versa. Apart from the criteria
related to children, there is also room for manipulating the system by adjusting ﬁling status.
While a married couple ﬁling jointly is eligible for the credit, the resulting credit is smaller
than if they each ﬁled separately. Another source of potential fraud and complexity within
the system has to do with the deﬁnition of income for EITC. Generally, public assistance
beneﬁts are supposed to be excluded from calculation of income for the EITC purposes.
Certain types of income can make taxpayer ineligible if they exceed the threshold amount
($2,350 in 1999). They include interest, dividend, rent and royalties, capital gains and
passive income not related to self-employment.
There is evidence of non-compliance related to the eligibility criteria (McCubbin, 2000;
Liebman, 2000), but also some evidence that many mistakes are not intentional. Using a
random sample of EITC recipients examined by the IRS’s Criminal Investigations Division,
McCubbin (2000) ﬁnds that most of the overclaims are due to qualifying child errors (almost
70% of the total amount overclaimed). During audits agents were also asked to indicate
whether they believed that mistakes were intentional and based on this information the IRS
oﬃcials testiﬁed that approximately 50 percent of errors were not intentional (McCubbin,
2000)
2.2 Non-participation in EITC
Apart from the issue of non-compliance, non-participation in the EITC program has re-
ceived signiﬁcant attention from the government and researchers. Most of the studies on
EITC participation rely on datasets that allow to determine eligibility, such as the Census
Bureau’s Current Population Survey March Supplement (CPS) or the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP). However, even studies based on conﬁdential administrative
data sources such as Internal Revenue Service (2002) are unable to determine with certainty
whether an individual claimed EITC and instead rely on proxies such as whether the tax
return was ﬁled.
Scholz (1994) estimated that in 1990 approximately 80% of eligibles actually claimed
beneﬁts. A recent IRS study (Internal Revenue Service, 2002) states that in 1996 between
13% (based on march CPS) and 18% (based on SIPP) eligible individuals (between 2.3 and
3.4 million) did not ﬁle tax returns and therefore did not take advantage of the program.
However, as discussed below, there are a number of reasons why these numbers might be
an overestimate of the true non-participation rates during our period of study. First, IRS’s
computations rely on a very questionable treatment of a large group of potentially eligible
4individuals. They include in the denominator (therefore treating them as if they were
eligible) 23% of otherwise eligible individuals who refused to provide their SSN in the CPS
and 7% of respondents in the SIPP who refused to answer the question about ﬁling a tax
return. However these same individuals are not counted as non-participants. Both estimates
also assume that an eligible taxpayer who ﬁled a tax return actually claimed beneﬁts.
Holtzblatt and McCubbin (2003) present back-of-the-envelope calculations suggesting that
the true non-participation rate probably exceeds 20%.
Secondly, Hotz and Scholz (2003) speculate that non-participation in the 1990’s might
have increased for some groups due to changes in labor market participation of women as
well as repeated expansions during this period that forced taxpayers to learn new rules. Hill
et al. (1999) provide evidence suggesting that participation rates among women who used
to be on welfare are much lower (even as low as 50%) than overall participation rates.
The continued increase in the share of Hispanics in the US population might also have
aﬀected the rate of non-participation in recent years. Recent survey evidence (Maag, 2005)
indicates that among Hispanic low income parents, only 27% have heard of the EITC,
compared to an average of 58% for the entire population.
Finally, non-participation in the EITC is also aﬀected by the existence of a signiﬁcant
pool of non-ﬁlers of federal taxes. In a recent paper, Erard and Ho (2001) calculate that in
1988 about $5 billion in unpaid taxes are due to people who are legally obliged to ﬁle but
do not do so (the so-called “ghosts”). Most interesting in our context is their estimate that
29% of “ghosts” might actually be entitled to get money back but somehow do not ﬁle and,
moreover, that “ghosts” are likely to be over-represented in the EITC eligible groups.
Many advocacy groups concentrate their eﬀort on providing information about the pro-
gram6. The IRS itself continues to devote a lot of attention to the issue of non-participation.
In a recent press release, the IRS listed a number of ways in which it attempts to increase
participation including “working with more than 180 community-based organizations na-
tionwide to reach low-income workers who may be unaware of the EITC availability”, “help-
ing set up 14,000 volunteer centers that oﬀer free tax preparation for low-income and elderly
individuals”, “coordinating with mayors oﬃces nationwide to help identify low-wage earn-
ers who may qualify for EITC” and “teaming with a special grassroots cadre in two target
cities — Los Angeles and Miami —to reach out to taxpayers who have limited proﬁciency
in English but who may qualify for EITC.”7
2.3 E-ﬁling
The IRS introduced electronic ﬁling of tax returns in 1986. Electronic ﬁling is beneﬁcial
from the IRS point of view because it reduces the cost of handling paper returns and the
6For example, one of the websites devoted to the EITC ( http://www.eitc.info/eitc_basics/, accessed
on December 3
rd, 2003) states as its objective “Ensuring that more families know about and ﬁle for the tax
credits they are due.”
7http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=119792,00.html.
5likelihood of mistakes.8 Taxpayers can beneﬁt from electronic ﬁling in a number of ways.
First, returns ﬁled electronically have a much lower error rate than paper returns therefore
reducing the risk of audits and penalties. Second, the more eﬃcient handling of the returns
by the IRS and the reduced likelihood of mistakes both facilitate a much quicker potential
refund. Third, since software has to be involved in order to ﬁle a tax return electronically, it
increases the chance of discovering previously unknown opportunities for tax saving. Fourth,
taxpayers receive an immediate conﬁrmation that the return was accepted.
There are a few diﬀerent ways to ﬁle tax returns electronically, and patterns of ﬁling
changed over time. Most electronic ﬁling is done by professionals who are authorized by the
IRS as Electronic Return Originators (ERO). Some taxpayers choose to prepare their own
tax return and have a professional ﬁle it electronically. In other cases, a paid tax professional
also prepares the tax return. Throughout the paper we will be focused on electronic ﬁling;
whether a professional signed the tax return is secondary. In the late 1990s, many taxpayers
chose to ﬁle their tax returns by phone under the TeleFiling program. This option has always
been limited to taxpayers with relatively simple tax returns: the reach of this method of
e-ﬁling is limited to the group of childless taxpayers. These taxpayers have low income
maxima for EITC and low maximum beneﬁts. Because we are not able to distinguish
between teleﬁling and other forms of e-ﬁling in our data, we consider this low-income group
separately in our analysis. Finally, the direct on-line ﬁling is another possibility to ﬁle
electronically, but its importance was in the period that we consider limited.9
Forty one states and the District of Columbia operate their own income tax systems.
The relationship of state and federal income taxes varies, but in each case they are operated
as separate systems. Traditionally, taxpayers were (and still are) required to ﬁle both federal
and state tax return. States started introducing their own electronic ﬁling systems in the
early 1990s, a few years after federal electronic ﬁling was introduced. Most income tax
states (except for California, Maine, Massachusetts and Minnesota) took advantage of the
broader IRS initiative operated by the IRS Oﬃce of FedState Relations established in 1991.
This was one of the IRS’s eﬀorts intended to achieve the 80% electronic ﬁling rate by 2007,
as outlined in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. In these states, there is
only one electronic return to be ﬁled, with the IRS transmitting the relevant information to
the state on the taxpayers’ behalf. The remaining four states operate their own electronic
systems. Two states (Illinois and Maryland), operated their own electronic ﬁling systems
before they joined the federal program. The timing of introduction of state electronic ﬁling
varied between 1990 for South Carolina and 2001 for Hawaii and Vermont. We later show
that the introduction of state electronic ﬁling had signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of federal
8According to the IRS “Questions and Answers” about e-ﬁling using a tax preparer (http://www.irs.
gov/efile/page/0,,id=10093,00.html), accessed February 15, 2004), the error rate for electronically ﬁled
returns is less than 1%, compared to the error rate for paper returns which is about 20%.
9In 1999, the last year in our sample, approximately 8% of electronic returns were ﬁled online and the
penetration of this method was most likely even lower at the bottom of the income distribution. Our data
does not allow for separating online ﬁling from other means of electronic ﬁling.
6returns that were ﬁled electronically.
The FedState program also produced other types of interactions between federal and
state tax authorities including sharing computer ﬁles with taxpayer information, sharing
audit results and organizing seminars for tax practitioners, cooperation in administration
of other types of taxes. By the late 1990s, the program also led to the introduction of joint
state/federal TeleFiling systems that allowed the qualiﬁed taxpayers to ﬁle their taxes over
the phone. While the federal TeleFiling system was tested in Ohio as early as in 1992 and
became available nationwide in 1996, only 3 states introduced it before 1996; 11 still do not
have one in place. The joint state/federal TeleFiling possibility was only introduced for the
returns ﬁled for 1998 in Indiana and Kentucky, and by 2003 it was still only available in
seven states. Although, as discussed above, claiming EITC using TeleFile is not a concern,
it is possible that media/marketing coverage of this new possibility might have attracted
attention to other types of electronic ﬁling possibilities. In particular, we will show as a
robustness check that the number of e-ﬁlers responds to state TeleFiling programs but EITC
participation does not.
2.4 The Role of Tax Preparers
We use the term “tax preparer” to describe any professional involved in the process of ﬁling
a tax return, including electronic return originators (so-called EROs) who ﬁle electronically
tax returns prepared by their customers. In terms of the structure of the tax preparation
industry, two large companies dominate in the market: H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt.
Together they controlled roughly 30% of the electronic ﬁling market in 2001 (15.6% of all re-
turns ﬁled). The remaining 70% is highly diversiﬁed and includes both trained professionals
and amateurs who often work only during the tax season.
The introduction of electronic ﬁling was from the very beginning a partnership between
the IRS and the tax preparation industry. In fact, in 1985, the ﬁrst pilot electronic ﬁling
program was a partnership between the IRS and H&R Block, the largest tax preparation
company in the market.10 The advantages to the tax industry of this partnership were
twofold. First, at least until the late 1990’s when on-line ﬁling began to take oﬀ, anyone
interested in ﬁling taxes electronically basically had to use the services of the tax prepa-
ration industry. According to an IRS insider “when the program began, the only way to
electronically ﬁle a 1040 was to pay a private tax preparer for the privilege” (Davis, 1998,
p. 70).
Secondly, the IRS was willing to share information about ﬁlers with the tax preparers.
Tax preparers actively market Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs). They are very short term
loans made usually by a tax preparer as the intermediary of a bank to an electronic taxpayer
once a tax return is ﬁled. RALs are due to be repaid when the refund is received from the
IRS. For every tax return submitted electronically, the IRS would immediately issue a direct
10See Fletcher (2003).
7deposit indicator (DDI), also known as the debt indicator or the refund oﬀset indicator. This
indicator informs the tax preparer if the refund requested by the taxpayer will be reduced
because of a debt owed to the IRS or other federal agencies, such as outstanding child
support or student loans. Therefore, the existence of this debt indicator greatly reduced
the risks associated with RALs. Some industry experts consider the introduction of RAL’s
as the chief incentive driving the volume of electronic ﬁling.11 The IRS further reduced the
risk of RALs by making it possible that the refund be deposited directly to the creditor’s
account.
As early as 1990, it was possible to ﬁle taxes electronically at many locations across the
country. For example, a company called Instatax had as many as 7000 sites in 1990 located
in all states at major retail chains such as Mailboxes Etc., 7-Eleven, or Revco drugstores.12
At these particular locations, no actual tax preparation was done; instead customers brought
returns prepared by themselves or by outside tax professionals. These returns were faxed to
the company headquarters, veriﬁed for inconsistencies, and ﬁled electronically with the IRS.
Refund Anticipation Loans were provided through an arrangement with the Greenwood
Trust Company once the IRS conﬁrmed that the refund was forthcoming. The fee for
electronic ﬁling was $29.95 and the fee for the loan was $35. Fees for the RAL in the
following years appeared higher. A newspaper article in 199213 reported fees at H&R Block
to be $63. Some places in the Atlanta area charged as much as $112. By 1995, the fee
for a $1,000 loan was reportedly $89, even though the loan was typically repaid within 13
days.14 The reported fees for RALs are probably not a reliable measure of their actual cost,
because the RALs are purchased as a part of a package with electronic ﬁling and may also
involve tax preparation. There is usually also a processing fee involved. According to a
2003 report by a consumer advocacy group (Wu and Fox, 2003), a tax ﬁler could expect to
pay on average $75 for a RAL fee, $40 for an electronic ﬁling fee, $100 for a tax preparation
fee and another $33 for additional processing fees. The estimated drain of all these fees on
the overall EITC program was around $1.2 billion, roughly 4% of total EITC spending.15
Berube et al. (2002) document that commercial tax preparers target low income neigh-
borhoods. Based on the data for the largest 100 metropolitan areas, they found that in
11December 6, 1994 speech by Ms. Peggy Rule, IRS Director for Electronic Filing Programs, before the
AICPA Tax Division, Retrieved May 20
th, 2004 from the World Wide Web: http://www.nysscpa.org/
prof_library/Briefingbook/Spring96/tax2.tbb.htm.
12This paragraph is based on Jan M. Rosen, “Electronic Filing For Tax Returns”, New York Times,
February 10, 1990.
13“Impatience proves costly with ’instant tax refunds’ Fees of more than $100 aren’t unusual”, Atlanta
Constitution, February 7, 1994
14David Cay Johnston, “IRS and Lender Settle Dispute on Refunds,” New York Times, March 4, 1995.
15Note that even if we add the administrative costs to the IRS (estimated at around 1% of EITC beneﬁts)
to the above mentioned costs related to the preparation of returns, the total costs of EITC still compare
very favorably to the administrative costs of, for example, AFDC (Liebman, 1998, estimated in 1995 at 16%
of beneﬁts paid). Even if we only use as a base of this calculation the 50% of EITC claimants who e-ﬁle, we
are left with a number smaller than 10% of the total spending on the program.
81999 zip codes with a share of EITC recipients greater than 30% had on average 15 EROs
per 10,000 taxpayers, while those with the share below 5% had on average 10 EROs per
10,000 taxpayers. They also estimate that almost half of 1999 EITC dollars involved RALs.
The importance of IRS cooperation in securing Refund Anticipation Loans was stressed
by the industry. When the IRS eliminated the Direct Deposit Indicator and announced
that it will send refunds directly to taxpayers in November of 1994,16 some experts in
the industry predicted that delinquency rate on RAL will increase from the extreme low
of 1% to as much as 20% to 40%.17 There is evidence that electronic ﬁling and Refund
Anticipation Loans played an important role for tax preparation companies. On the day
of the 1994 announcement that the IRS will stop providing the Direct Deposit Indicator
to e-ﬁlers, shares of H&R Block fell by 17%.18 Similarly, RALs and similar quick refund
products contributed 29.8% of total revenue for Jackson Hewitt, the second largest ﬁrm in
the market.19
The introduction of electronic ﬁling as a new technology for tax preparation had a large
eﬀect on this particular industry. Thus, the founder of Jackson Hewitt was “mapping the
company’s expansion quite deliberately over the years to the IRS’s test sites for its e-ﬁling
program [and] the plan helped make Jackson Hewitt, now a leader in providing electronic
tax services, the second largest tax preparation company in the nation.”20
Similarly, the introduction of state electronic ﬁling provided an additional incentive for
tax preparers to provide e-ﬁling services because it introduced the possibility of going all-
electronic, reducing the paperwork and increasing the size of potential refund for the purpose
of oﬀering RALs. Beneﬁts from electronic ﬁling, such as speedy refunds, are also naturally
increased from the point of view of the taxpayer when two rather than one returns can be
ﬁled in this way.21 The importance of the joint state/federal electronic ﬁling programs in
inducing the tax preparation industry to adopt and popularize e-ﬁling as a method for ﬁling
federal tax returns has been repeatedly highlighted by the IRS. Thus in a recent report to
Congress, the Electronic Tax Administration Advisory Committee (2002) emphasized that
“the ability to simultaneously ﬁle both a federal and a state return adds signiﬁcantly to the
value of e-ﬁling for taxpayers and tax practitioners, and will lead to continued growth of
e-ﬁling at the federal level”.
The signiﬁcant role that electronic ﬁling of state taxes plays for the tax preparation
16This policy was in eﬀect during the 1995 season (i.e., 1994 tax returns) only. We test the robustness of
our results to this policy change in the empirical section.
17David Cay Johnston, “Bank Challenges I.R.S. on Refunds for Borrowers”, New York Times, February
22, 1995.
18“H&R Block Stock Plunges On Electronic Filing Change”, New York Times, November 23, 1994.
19Source: Tax Notes, Sept. 22, 2003, p. 1488.
20Source: Tax Notes, Apr. 9, 2001, p. 189.
21Another channel through which state electronic ﬁling might have stimulated federal ﬁling is through
advertisement campaigns. For example, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue actively advertised the
program to the tax preparers (see “Wisconsin: DOR Encourages Electronic Filing,” August 23, 1993, 5
State Tax Notes 403.
9industry can be seen from the recent development of a free e-ﬁling program of federal
taxes for low income people, a cooperation between the IRS and the Free File Alliance, an
organization of the tax preparation industry. Maybe not surprisingly, almost all participants
in the free federal e-ﬁle program charge a fee for e-ﬁling of state taxes, equal in the case of
H&R to $24.95 for the 2003 ﬁling season.22 Similarly, according to a representative from a
leading provider of electronic ﬁling software for the tax preparation industry, the ability of
their product to handle state electronic ﬁling allowed their “customers to get an early start
on their tax season and a jump on their competition.”23
3 A Model of the Eﬀect of E-Filing on EITC Participation
In order to highlight how the introduction of electronic ﬁling can aﬀect EITC participation,
we present a simple model. Assume that there are many (heterogeneous) communities.
There are the same number of individuals in each community, normalized to equal one. In
community i, αi individuals are eligible for EITC and 1 − αi are not. The distribution of
communities is characterized by the c.d.f. F(α) and the total number of communities is
normalized to one. One straightforward interpretation of a community is as a geographical
unit, but it can also be interpreted as a particular customer base. The key assumption of
the model will be that it is costly for a tax preparer to reach a “community.” The model
applies both to the situation where a tax preparer makes a decision of whether to open a
new location and to a situation where a tax preparer decides to serve a wider customer base
from an existing location.
Preferences of individual j are characterized by cj − Lj where cj is the consumption
level and Lj measures the importance of liquidity constraints and therefore the value of
receiving the refund quickly. Fraction γ of eligible individuals are liquidity constrained,
so that Lj = L (where L is a constant) when they have to wait for a refund and Lj = 0
otherwise. The remaining individuals are not liquidity constrained, so that Lj = 0 regardless
of the timing of the refund. Consequently, the ﬁrst type of individuals will decide to select
a speedy refund if its price is lower than L while others will never buy it.
The eligibles are not necessarily aware of the EITC. We assume that either everyone
in the community is aware of the program or nobody is. In order to stress the role of tax
preparers, we assume that a community is aware of the EITC if and only if a tax preparer
decides to locate there. A tax preparer decides to enter the community if it is proﬁtable
to do so. Entry requires paying the ﬁxed cost of f. Although in general tax preparers
provide many layers of service including preparation of the return, electronic ﬁling and
refund anticipation loans, we simplify by assuming that the product that tax preparers sell
22H&R Block advertisement, http://www.hrblock.com/taxes/partner/product.jsp?productId=54, re-
trieved from the World Wide Web May 18
th, 2004.
23Drake Software, source: www.taxingsubjects.com/archives/issue11 articles/artcl1.html, re-
trieved from the World Wide Web on May 18
th, 2004
10is a speedy refund. In practice, both electronic ﬁling alone and e-ﬁling coupled with RAL
fall into this category: both of these accelerate the refund — in the latter case the refund is
received immediately, in the former it is received signiﬁcantly faster than if the return was
ﬁled in the traditional way.24,25 Critically, we assume that following the entry taxpayers
who become aware of EITC and who value speedy refunds are not able to use alternative
means of obtaining the refund. As discussed earlier, it appears to be a fair description of
the situation throughout the 1990s, because electronic ﬁling not through a commercial tax
preparer was next to impossible for anyone but fairly computer savvy individuals.
The marginal cost of providing a speedy refund in period t is given by dt. Once the
tax preparer decides to enter the community, the maximum price that can be charged for a
speedy refund is L — the value of the refund to liquidity constrained taxpayers. When the
price is lower than L, all liquidity constrained taxpayers will decide to purchase the refund.
Given the price pi ≤ L of the speedy refund, the tax preparers’ proﬁt in community i is
equal to πt(pi) = (pi − dt)αiγ − f. There will be entry to the community whenever proﬁts
at the maximum feasible price of L are positive:




Given the cost of dt, there will be entry and therefore the community will be aware of the
EITC for suﬃciently large values of αi, i.e. the ones that exceed ω(dt). Clearly, ω0(dt) > 0.
Therefore, when the cost of a speedy refund goes down, the threshold for entry goes down
as well and tax preparers enter additional communities.
Proposition 1. Suppose that dt+1 < dt. Then EITC participation in year t+1 is higher by
β(dt+1,dt) and the number of EITC participants who rely on tax preparer service increases
by γβ(dt+1,dt), where β(d1,d2) =
R ω(d1)
ω(d2) dF(α).
Proof. Following the decrease in the cost of a speedy refund, tax preparers enter com-




. The number of individuals in these communities is
given by β(dt+1,dt). Fraction γ of these individuals will purchase speedy refunds from tax
preparers.
The introduction of electronic ﬁling corresponds to a reduction of the price of a refund.
As discussed above, ﬁling a tax return electronically signiﬁcantly reduces the time it takes to
24In fact, using a tax preparer without e-ﬁling may also be interpreted in a similar way: the reduced
likelihood of a mistake amounts to a higher probability that a refund will be received without a delay.
25On its web page, H&R Block highlights the speed of receiving the refund as the critical factor in the
development of e-ﬁling: “In a 1986 test with the IRS, H&R Block ﬁled 22,000 returns electronically from
two sites. The test was a success: Electronic ﬁling signiﬁcantly reduced the amount of time required for a
taxpayer to receive a refund. More than a decade later, H&R Block’s trademarked “Rapid Refund” service
has become synonymous with electronic ﬁling. Now, the company ﬁles nearly half of the total number
of returns ﬁled electronically with the IRS.” (http://www.hrblock.com/presscenter/about/history.jsp,
accessed March 1
st, 2004.)
11receive the refund both due to faster processing by the IRS and due to the reduced likelihood
of mistakes. Second, providing a loan toward a future refund became much less risky due to
the IRS providing a debt indicator and making it possible to deposit the refund directly to
the creditor’s bank account, and the development of cooperative agreements among banks
that facilitate identifying cheaters. The cost is further reduced when it is possible to ﬁle both
state and federal tax electronically. The model predicts, therefore, that the introduction
of electronic ﬁling will increase the number of EITC recipients. However, only fraction γ
of them will rely on tax preparers. The activity of tax preparers has a spillover eﬀect of
informing the remaining 1 − γ of population about the EITC.
The model highlights two important aspects of the institutional environment that are
important for increased participation in the program and these facts ﬁt well with the actual
developments in the United States in the 1990s. First, tax preparers have to be able to
provide a product that is valued by low-income individuals. In the context of EITC, this
product is the quick refund. As discussed earlier, the marginal cost of providing a quick
refund was reduced signiﬁcantly due to the introduction of electronic ﬁling of tax returns.
Second, because information about the existence of the program is non-excludable, the al-
ternative means of obtaining the service provided by tax preparers (i.e., quick refund) must
be unavailable or at least costly. By making it diﬃcult to ﬁle electronically other than
through a tax preparer, the IRS guaranteed that this condition was met. It is the combi-
nation of these two assumptions that leads to an increase in participation, as demonstrated
by Proposition 1.
4 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
Our main sources of data are the annual public use samples of federal income tax returns
(“Tax Model Files”) issued by the Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the IRS and avail-
able from the NBER.26 These samples are available for most years between 1960 and 1999
(with the exception of 1961, 1963 and 1965). Our study period starts in 1988, the ﬁrst year
for which our dataset includes information on whether a tax return was ﬁled electronically,
and stops in 1999, the latest year for which the data is available. The size of yearly samples
varies between 90,0000 and 130,000 observations, with between 13,000 and 32,000 obser-
vations having adjusted gross income below 30,000.27 The public use ﬁles contain most of
the information from federal tax returns, but no other information.28 For example, we can
observe the state of residence, the EITC status and payment, information on whether a pro-
fessional was involved in preparing the return, the electronic ﬁling indicator, adjusted gross
26The documentation for this dataset can be accessed at www.nber.org/taxsim.
27In this dataset high income individuals are oversampled.
28Some information (including state of residence) is blurred or erased for high-income (above $200 thou-
sand) taxpayers to protect taxpayer conﬁdentiality. Since we are interested in the low income group only,
this is not a major problem.
12income, ﬁling status and the number of dependents. We use sampling weights provided by
the SOI.
We aggregate all information by state and income categories described below rather
than using individual level data. The main reason for this approach is that we doubt the
validity of the assumption that our samples are identical from one year to the next. In fact,
previewing our results, we ﬁnd that the most important channel of increased participation is
through an increase in the number of tax ﬁlers: some individuals who used not to ﬁle a tax
return started to do so after electronic ﬁling was introduced. Furthermore, the existence of
an electronic ﬁling program varies only by year and state so that our source of identiﬁcation
is not compromised by aggregation. The standard argument for using individual level
data is to control for observable individual characteristics. As we have already mentioned,
our dataset contains very limited background information about ﬁlers. Moreover, of the
variables included in the data, it is diﬃcult to think of an observable personal characteristic
that would not be endogenous: even demographic characteristics such as marital (ﬁling)
status or the number of children as reported on the tax return are likely to be responsive to
EITC considerations because they aﬀect eligibility and generosity of beneﬁts. Furthermore,
the response on the ﬁling/non-ﬁling status makes the distribution of these characteristics
endogenous even in the absence of taxpayers’ attempts to game the system.
Over the twelve year long period (1988-1999) the ﬁfty states plus the District of Columbia
result in 612 cells. We usually use fewer observations because in our main speciﬁcations
we are not using states without their own income tax. The Tax Model Data is designed
to be a representative sample of tax ﬁlers. We compared estimates of the number of EITC
recipients as well as the number electronic ﬁlers by tax preparation status to the totals
published by the IRS and they closely match.
We divided taxpayers into income categories based on their AGI.29 Both adjusted gross
income and earned income have to be below the relevant threshold (depending on the
number of children and ﬁling status) to be eligible for the EITC. All our dollar ﬁgures
are expressed in 2000 dollars and adjusted for inﬂation. The maximum threshold between
1988 and 1999 was $31,794 (in real 2000 dollars). The maximum threshold for childless
individuals was $10,597. Because the credit for childless individuals was introduced in
the middle of our sample, in 1994, our major analysis is performed on the $10,597-$31,794
category that excludes childless EITC recipients. We refer to this category as “10-30K”. We
also present some results based on the $0-$10,597 category (and call it the 0-10K category)
and divide the 10-30K category into two brackets by splitting it at $20,000, thus creating
29The dataset contains a measure of the Earned Income, constructed by the SOI. Although taxpayers do
not have to report their Earned Income directly, they need to determine it for the purpose of establishing
eligibility and computation of the credit on the so-called EIC form. This form does not have to be submitted
with the tax returns. We found that the constructed earned income measure does not match closely with
the size of the EITC refund. It is also not available for non-EITC recipients. The AGI does not suﬀer from
these problems.
13two additional income categories called the “10-20K” and “20-30K” categories. Finally we
look at the whole category of individuals below $31,794 (“0-30K”). All EITC recipients in
our dataset are included in this last category.
The major reason for this approach is to better account for changes in the criteria
for receiving the EITC. The upper bound of earned income for receiving EITC beneﬁts
varied between $26,892 and $31,794 of real 2000 dollars. Since 1994, childless individuals
are also eligible for receiving EITC beneﬁts. The maximum income for receiving these
types of beneﬁts varied between $10,464 and $10,596. Because our dataset does not contain
information about the number of children that are qualifying for EITC purposes, we are not
able to precisely distinguish between diﬀerent categories of EITC ﬁlers.30 Changes in the
number of low income EITC recipients are likely to be to a large extent driven by altered
eligibility criteria. Dividing the sample into income groups allows us to isolate the impact of
these changes. This approach will also make it possible to study potential shifting between
income categories.
4.1 Summary Statistics
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 1a present the mean number of people who claim EITC on
their federal tax return by year and income category for the period 1988-1999. The data
shows an increase in the penetration of the program during this period from 10% to 16%
(an increase from 11 to 19 million). The table also highlights the major federal expansions
of the EITC program in 1993 and shows that its eﬀect is in fact limited to the 0-10K
category.31 The following four columns of Table 1a present analogous statistics for electronic
ﬁlers. Although introduced in 1986, this federal program grew slowly in the ﬁrst years
after implementation so that by 1990 less than 10% of tax returns were ﬁled electronically.
Federal electronic ﬁling grew steadily in the 1990’s. One notable but complicating feature
of the trend in electronic ﬁling is the temporary fall between 1993 and 1994. Although the
program was expanded at the same time, the source of the drop is due to attempts by the
IRS to reduce cheating.32 The measures involved both administrative requirements, such
as the requirement to include the qualifying child’s Social Security number on the return,
as well as reduced cooperation with electronic returns originators. This change stopped
30We have attempted to classify taxpayers into diﬀerent categories based on the size of credit. We were
not always able to reconcile the amount of the credit with taxpayers income under any of the possible EITC
claiming categories, although we were able to determine it for most of the taxpayers. We will show some
results based on this classiﬁcation as our robustness checks.
31The increase in participation following the 1993 expansion is mostly due to extending eligibility to
childless individuals. The total number of EITC recipients increased from 15.1 to 19 million between 1993
and 1994. In our 10-30K category that does not include childless individuals, the number of EITC returns
increased from 10.0 to 10.3 million between 1993 and 1994, while the number of returns in the 0-10K category,
that includes all of the childless EITC recipients, increased from 5.1 to 8.6 million.
32Table 1a demonstrates that this drop is most pronounced in the 10-30K income category that does not
include newly eligible recipients.
14the growth of e-ﬁling for one year only. Furthermore, this change was likely perceived as
temporary because the IRS had promised to facilitate usage of RALs in the future even
before the end the same tax season. 33 Because this event falls exactly in the middle of our
sample, we are not able to concentrate on years solely before or solely after it, but we will
carefully investigate to make sure that this event is not behind our results.34
Trends in electronic ﬁling by income category over this period are particularly interest-
ing. For income groups in the 0-30K category, the proportion of electronic ﬁlers is higher
throughout this period indicative of the fact that poorer people are more likely to ﬁle elec-
tronically. The proportion of electronic ﬁlers in the higher income groups is generally below
10% throughout this period with the exception of the period 1997-1999 when on-line ﬁl-
ing becomes a popular method of ﬁling. Figure 1 shows the overall trends in the major
variables.
The last four columns of Table 1a summarize the proportion of tax returns that were
completed with the help of a paid tax preparer by income brackets and over time. Somewhat
surprisingly, the average number of people relying on outside help in preparing their tax
returns is around 50% and comparable across income groups. Perhaps this reﬂects the
balancing of two separate eﬀects: people in lower income groups have a harder time ﬁlling
out their returns without help from preparers but people with higher incomes have more
complicated returns. However, the lower income groups experienced the largest uptake in
relying on tax professionals and this increase is likely the result of the expansions of the
EITC program during this period.
The extent of reliance on professional tax services among EITC claimants is described in
Table 1b. Among EITC recipients, the proportion of EITC claims submitted electronically
is large, growing over time and averages about 30%. The proportion of EITC recipients who
do not prepare their own tax returns is also increasing and exceeding 60% by the end of the
period. These trends for the 10-30K category are depicted in Figure 2. In conclusion, these
summary statistics provide strong evidence that people in income groups that claim EITC
on their federal tax returns are very likely to submit their tax returns electronically and
usually with the help of a tax preparer. Therefore any policy intervention that would reduce
the cost of ﬁling electronically, as is the case with the introduction of electronic ﬁling of
state taxes discussed above, could potentially have an eﬀect on the number of EITC claims.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
We use information provided by the IRS to code the existence of a program allowing elec-
tronic ﬁling of state income taxes and to date the introduction of such programs.35 We
33David Cay Johnston, “IRS and Lender Settle Dispute on Refunds,” New York Times, March 4, 1995.
34One might also note that there is no similar eﬀect for EITC claims. Table 1a shows that there was
virtually no change in the EITC claims between 1993 and 1994 for the 10-30K category.
35http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/state2.pdf, accessed December 15, 2003.
15veriﬁed this information (and corrected when necessary) against the IRS press releases.36
Of the ﬁfty states and the District of Columbia, nine do not have a state income tax:
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington
and Wyoming. In addition, two states North Dakota and Ohio introduced electronic ﬁling
in 1999, the last year for which the data are available, whereas Hawaii and Vermont only
adopted this procedure in 2001. Of the remaining 38 states, six states (California, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts and Minnesota) ﬁrst introduced their own independent
program for electronic submission of state taxes but the electronic submission was not done
jointly with the federal returns. The remaining states introduced joint electronic ﬁling of
federal and state income tax returns, under the IRS supervised Federal/State Electronic
Filing Program. Of the six “independent” states Illinois and Maryland joined the StateFed
program in 1995 while the four other states continue their separate programs.
Table 1c shows the timing of introduction of the electronic ﬁling programs. In almost
all cases, in the year of the introduction the program was tested on a small population and,
therefore, our treatment variable is equal to one if the given year is strictly greater than
the year shown in the table.37 There is substantial variation in the timing of state e-ﬁling
programs. Minnesota introduced its program in 1989, while South Carolina, Maryland
and Illinois did so in 1990 (of these, only South Carolina’s program was a part of the
Federal/State Electronic Filing Program). Another 4 states implemented the program in
1991, 10 in 1992, 8 in 1993 and 7 in 1994. Implementation in the remaining nine states was
spread over the following six years, with Vermont and Hawaii adopting in 2001.38
Our identiﬁcation strategy uses the variation resulting from the staggered timing of
the introduction of electronic ﬁling of state taxes as a way to estimate the eﬀects of these
programs on electronic ﬁling of federal income taxes and its impact on federal EITC partic-
ipation. Furthermore, we are also interested in understanding to what extent any potential
increases in EITC uptake are explained by noncompliance. Our key identifying assump-
tion is that once we include controls, the timing of the introduction of the state electronic
ﬁling programs is not correlated with other factors that might have an eﬀect on our out-
come variables. Figure 3 shows estimates of non-participation rates in 1996 as estimated
by the Internal Revenue Service (2002) against the timing of the introduction of the state
electronic ﬁling programs. There is no obvious relationship between the two variables and
there is also very signiﬁcant variation in non-participation rates suggesting that the non-
participation rates were unrelated to the decision to introduce a state e-ﬁling program. The
non-participation rate for states treated pre-1996 should be aﬀected due to early introduc-
tion of the programs, obscuring the interpretation of this picture. However the remaining
36Available from www.unclefed.com
37The table also shows the year of introduction of state TeleFiling programs and the timing of joint
Federal/State Programs.
38As a robustness check, we also perform our analysis by deﬁning all states without a state income tax as
never treated. Alternatively, we also deﬁne our treatment as the introduction of the Federal/State Electronic
Filing Program since this program is arguably uniformly applied across states.
16large variation in the non-participation rates suggests that the pre-existing diﬀerences are
not likely to explain the timing of the programs. Similarly, we plot in Figure 4 the average
number of EITC recipients by state in 1989 against the timing of the state electronic ﬁling
programs and also ﬁnd no visible relation between these two variables.
One way to test the identifying assumption is to study if the timing of the state programs
is related to any trends in our variables of interest. To preview our results, we show in
Figures 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b that once controls are included in the regression framework, the timing
of state electronic ﬁling programs is not related in a systematic way to trends in electronic
ﬁling of federal returns prior to implementation or to trends in EITC participation. This
would be the case in a situation in which state electronic ﬁling is implemented only after
federal electronic ﬁling was increasing for other reasons.
We estimate OLS regressions of the following form:




st + β1δs + β2τt + β3tδs + st , (2)
where outcomest is one of our dependent variables of interest (usually, electronic ﬁlers or
EITC claimants), measured in logs or shares for each year and state cell in a given income
category. The variables statefilingi are a set of dummy variables equal to one if a state had
adopted state electronic ﬁling i years ago39 and δs and τt are a set of dummy variables for
state and year respectively. Our preferred speciﬁcation also controls for state-speciﬁc trends
(tδs), which should account for other unobservable factors that might be slowly changing at
the state level over time. We often restrict our speciﬁcations to include only the treatment
dummy indicating whether a given state has an electronic ﬁling program for state income
taxes (it corresponds to the assumption that αi = αj for any i,j > 0).
In our analysis, we run a number of alternative speciﬁcations in order to test the validity
of our results. We present ﬁgures based on the models that include both leads and lags
in order to better understand whether we appropriately control for any trends in the data
before the introduction of joint electronic ﬁling. Since in our unbalanced panel not all
states have data available for each year relative to the implementation date of electronic
ﬁling of state taxes, the number of states identifying a particular statefilingi coeﬃcient
is not constant and these compositional changes could give rise to possible trends in the
data around the implementation date. Therefore, we also include speciﬁcations using a
“balanced” panel of 35 states that have at least 3 years of post treatment data. Finally
we provide a number of additional robustness checks: we deﬁne treatment based on the
timing of the joint federal/state ﬁling programs rather than own independent electronic
ﬁling system, we code states without a state income tax as “always treated”, we change
the income brackets of interest, and we also ran our main speciﬁcations omitting individual
states and years.
39We restrict i not bigger than 4 and deﬁne the fourth dummy variable to equal one if the state was
treated four or more years ago.
17In order to check the robustness of our results, we also allow for the possibility of a
diﬀerent regime pre-1994, when the IRS tightened its enforcement of EITC and post-1996
following the welfare reform. We do that by introducing the interactions of state ﬁxed eﬀects
with pre-1994 and post-1996 dummy respectively. The tightening of enforcement could have
aﬀected states where tax preparers were more prevalent more than other states and this
could bias our estimated coeﬃcients. Furthermore, this approach allows us to potentially
check whether cheating is an important component of the eﬀect we identify. The welfare
reform might have increased labor force participation (see Blank, 2002, for a review of the
literature) and therefore the pool of potential EITC recipients. Because reforms were state-
speciﬁc, it is possible that these eﬀects are not accounted for by the inclusion of year ﬁxed
eﬀects. If the parameters of state welfare reforms and therefore labor participation response
were coincidentally correlated with the introduction of electronic ﬁling programs, this could
lead to a spurious relationship of EITC participation and the timing of state electronic ﬁling
programs.
We deﬁne our outcome variables in two possible ways: shares or logs. Shares are deﬁned
by dividing the number of individuals with a particular characteristic in the category of
interest by the total number of returns ﬁled in the state during the given year. In other
words, these are shares of all tax ﬁlers. As a result, these numbers are directly comparable
and additive across income categories. This approach will make it straightforward to analyze
ﬂows between income categories.
Deﬁning our variables in logs is complicated by the fact that in the beginning of the
period (1988-1990) we have a small number of zeros in the sample.40 Therefore, in order
to take advantage of the convenient percentage interpretation of logged variables, for any
variable involving electronic ﬁling we take logs of the number of individuals plus 1% of
state tax returns. This adjustment is mechanically customized to the state’s population and
addresses the problem of zeros. Some changes in our variables of interest may simultaneously
correspond to changes in the number of tax returns in a given state but will increase the
sensitivity of our variable to such changes by at most 1%. This adjustment should not
therefore aﬀect our results in a quantitatively important way but it allows us to keep our
sample balanced.41
Throughout the remaining sections, we present results for both shares and logs. De-
pending on the question, the interpretation of one measure may be easier than the other.
In the case of the log speciﬁcation, we either implicitly assume that the percentage eﬀect
of treatment is uniform across states or alternatively we evaluate the average percentage
treatment. In the case of share speciﬁcation, we make the corresponding assumption in
40The exact breakdown of the number of zeros in a given year is as follows: 20 states in 1988, 2 in 1989, 1
in 1990 and 1991 and no zero values afterwards. As discussed later in the text, results are robust to dropping
zeros or starting in 1991.
41Changes in the size of this adjustment within a reasonable range do not aﬀect our results in an important
way. Also, as discussed later, dropping early years (when zeros occur) from the sample does not aﬀect the
results.
18terms of the share of state’s taxpayers. An added advantage of presenting the results in
both shares and logs is that we are providing a robustness check of the functional form
assumptions of our regression speciﬁcations.
Bertrand et al. (2004) have recently pointed out that due to error terms in empirical
frameworks similar to ours having unknown autocorrelation structure, regular standard er-
rors are potentially very signiﬁcantly biased (usually downwards). We address this problem
by reporting results from four diﬀerent approaches. Our baseline standard errors are based
on the standard bootstrap procedure (using 10,000 iterations). Additionally, whenever we
include the dummy for the presence of a state e-ﬁling program, we report p-values from
the block bootstrap procedure,42 the p-values based on the robust (“sandwich”) covariance
matrix estimator that allows for an unknown form of heteroskedasticity, the p-values based
on the estimate of the robust covariance matrix allowing for a general form autocorrelation
(i.e., clustered at the state level) and p-values from the randomization test.43 Our major
conclusions do not depend on the choice of the approach; due to the relatively small sam-
ple size we concentrate on bootstrapped standard errors that are usually (but not always)
smaller than the (asymptotically consistent but with unknown small sample properties)
clustered errors and larger than the robust ones.
5 Results: Eﬀects on Electronic Filing and EITC Claims
5.1 Electronic Filing
In our basic analysis we concentrate on the 10-30K income category. The primary motiva-
tion for this restriction, as discussed earlier and presented in Table 1a, is that in 1994, the
EITC eligibility criteria for very low-income individuals were extended and the number of
EITC claims in the 0-10K category jumped discontinuously. No similar complications are
present for the 10-30K category.
We show the results of the eﬀect of the introduction of electronic ﬁling programs for state
taxes on the number of federal tax returns ﬁled electronically estimated using speciﬁcation
of the type described by equation 2 in Table 2a (using shares) and Table 2b (using logs). In
column (1) we show a speciﬁcation allowing for the set of four post-reform dummy variables,
while in column (2) we show the results of a speciﬁcation that further restricts the eﬀect of
42P-values are based on bootstrapping the studentized coeﬃcient on the treatment dummy. As discussed
by Horowitz (2000), if possible, one should bootstrap a “pivotal” statistic such as the t-value rather than
bootstrapping directly non-pivotal statistics such as a regression parameter.
43We implement the randomization test by randomly reassigning the actual dates of treatment across states
and re-estimating the same speciﬁcation. The p-value is the fraction of estimates (based on 10000 draws)
with the absolute value that was higher than the baseline one. The randomization p-values address the
critique of Bertrand et al. (2004) head on by showing the fraction of similar (artiﬁcial) experiments that
would result in even higher estimates. While this approach can mechanically assure the right size of the
test, its results cannot be interpreted in a standard way. See Kennedy (1995) for the discussion of their use
in econometrics.
19the introduction of state electronic ﬁling to be constant over time. Columns (3) and (4) are
similar to (1) and (2) but allow for state speciﬁc linear time trends in electronic ﬁling. In
our preferred speciﬁcations which include state-speciﬁc time trends, we ﬁnd that there is a
large and statistically signiﬁcant increase in the number of federal electronic ﬁlers following
the introduction of such state programs.44
The share speciﬁcation indicates that (in an average state) an additional 0.7 to 1 percent-
age points of the population ﬁles electronically, depending on whether or not state-speciﬁc
time trends are included. The log speciﬁcation that allows for linear trends predicts a 10%
increase in e-ﬁling following the introduction of the program. These eﬀects are large and
statistically signiﬁcant.
In columns 5-8 of tables 2a and 2b, we run the same speciﬁcations as in columns 1-4 but
we restrict ourselves only to those states which have at least three years of post treatment
data. The results from these speciﬁcations in which the ﬁrst three statefiling dummies are
identiﬁed using a constant number of states, are very similar to our earlier results. They
suggest that our ﬁndings are not driven by compositional changes that might arise in an
unbalanced panel. The results with state-speciﬁc time trends are very close to the ones in
the baseline speciﬁcation. Leaving out state trends has only a minor eﬀect on the estimated
coeﬃcients. In the ﬁnal speciﬁcation we additionally include states without the income
tax.45 Given that the treatment for these states does not vary during the period, these
additional observations are solely used to identify the year eﬀects. This extension has no
impact on the estimated coeﬃcients that remain signiﬁcant and very close to the values
estimated based on the sample of states with income tax.
These results provide clear evidence that the state electronic ﬁling indeed had a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the number of federal returns that are ﬁled electronically and thus we
conclude that these changes provide an opportunity to identify the economic impact of
electronic ﬁling in general. One technical observation is that state-speciﬁc time trends play
an important role in the log-speciﬁcation. This is not particularly surprising because it is
certainly possible that the number of e-ﬁlers grows at a diﬀerent speed in diﬀerent states
either because of diﬀerences in the rates of population growth or because of diﬀerences in
the composition of population that aﬀect the rate of adoption of this approach. We pursue
our further analysis while allowing for state-speciﬁc trends in all of our speciﬁcations.46
Table 3 presents the results for other income categories. The eﬀect of electronic ﬁling is
44In fact of the speciﬁcations that we discuss in tables 2a and 2b the only insigniﬁcant result is the
regression for the logs that do not allow for state-speciﬁc time trends. This is the most questionable
speciﬁcation because electronic ﬁling is heavily trending during this period and assuming no diﬀerences
in trends across states is not appealing.
45It is easy to verify that the results must be identical regardless of whether these states are assumed to
be always or never treated.
46This approach occasionally makes a diﬀerence for our results in log speciﬁcations that involve dependent
variables related to e-ﬁling. The case for using state-speciﬁc time trends in the share speciﬁcations is weaker
and results with and without them are quite similar.
20signiﬁcant only in the 10-20K category. The lack of response for the wealthier individuals is
not particularly surprising because the impact of changes in electronic ﬁling was unlikely to
have played a signiﬁcant role for them. The value of receiving a refund quickly most likely
falls with income and therefore it appears unlikely that many higher income individuals
would be motivated to e-ﬁle by the introduction of state e-ﬁling. The informational aspects
that we highlighted in the discussion of the tax preparation industry have very limited
applicability in the context of higher income individuals who ﬁle their taxes anyway. Finally,
the alternative methods of e-ﬁling, such as ﬁling through own software from home in the mid-
1990s or using the Internet in the late 1990s, are most likely driven by other considerations
such as being technology savvy (Goolsbee, 2002).
It is more surprising to observe that e-ﬁling in neither the 0-10K category nor the
20-30K category appears responsive to the policy changes. Regardless of the reason (one
problem is a discrete change in eligibility for the 0-10K category in 1994), it suggests that
any response to treatment of our other variables of interest in these categories (such as
EITC claims) should be treated with caution and could indicate that the relationships we
estimate are spurious. However, there are possible explanations for a lack of response in
e-ﬁling in these categories that is consistent with observing eﬀects in the other variables.
As an example, it may be that increased e-ﬁling in, say, the 0-10K category is coupled with
behavioral responses that lead many individuals to shift to the 10-20K category. Such a
behavioral response could in principle lead to e-ﬁling being relatively stable, but it would
simultaneously lead to the a reduction in the number of individuals in the 0-10K category.
We will return to this issue in the next section. Finally, the EITC-related motives for e-ﬁling
are strongest in the 10-20K category, because it includes the plateau region where beneﬁts
are maximized.
5.2 EITC Claims
Next we turn to the impact on EITC claims. Tables 4a and 4b present results for the share
and log speciﬁcations respectively. These tables follow the same pattern as the tables for
electronic ﬁling. The results show the existence of a large positive eﬀect of our treatment
on the number of people claiming EITC on their federal returns and, similarly to the eﬀect
on electronic ﬁling, this eﬀect persists for the ﬁrst four years after implementation of these
programs. These are the main results of this paper. The following analysis will be devoted
to making sure that they are robust and to understanding the economic responses behind
them.
The results in Tables 4a are only slightly sensitive to the inclusion of state-speciﬁc
time trends and trends play no role in the log speciﬁcation presented in Table 4b.47 The
results using a “balanced” panel of all states are very similar to the baseline ones. The
47Contrary to e-ﬁling, EITC claims are not strongly trending and therefore state diﬀerences in the rate
of growth of EITC claims are not too important. Aggregate trends appear to control appropriately for any
time eﬀects
21ﬁnal speciﬁcation shows the instrumental variable estimate of the eﬀect of e-ﬁling on EITC
participation using the four stateﬁling dummies as instruments. The instrumental variable
estimate in the share speciﬁcation has a straightforward interpretation: 77% of an increase
in e-ﬁling due to the introduction of e-ﬁling programs corresponds to new EITC participants.
The estimate from the log speciﬁcation suggest that between 1988 and 1999 a 1% increase
in the number of e-ﬁlers leads, on average, to a 1% increase in the number of EITC claims.
This estimate should be interpreted as the average treatment eﬀect over the period. It
should also be noted that in all speciﬁcations in this paper states are weighted equally.48
In Table 5, we present the results by income categories. Consistently with the ﬁndings
for electronic ﬁling, we ﬁnd no evidence of response in neither the 0-10K category nor 20-30K
category. We also consider the impact of the treatment on the number of individuals not
receiving EITC. We ﬁnd that the number of such individuals (in the log speciﬁcation) does
not respond to the treatment while their share as a fraction of the total population appears
to decrease (albeit the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant). This suggests that the increase in
EITC participation that we ﬁnd is driven by new ﬁlers rather than by the existing regular
ﬁlers who were previously unaware of the program.49
Since our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the diﬀerential timing of the implementation
of these programs, we also added four leads to our speciﬁcation in order to better under-
stand if the shift in electronic ﬁling and EITC claims happens around the time of program
introduction. The coeﬃcient estimates for these regressions, which use our preferred spec-
iﬁcation that includes state-speciﬁc time trends from the unbalanced panel, can be easily
presented graphically. Figures 5a and 5b plots the coeﬃcients from the regressions using
electronic ﬁling as the dependent variable both for the log and the share speciﬁcation, while
Figure 6a and 6b does the same for EITC claims. The graphs are normalized relative to
the zero coeﬃcient on the omitted dummy for the year immediately preceding treatment
(year zero); and they also include conﬁdence intervals (at the 90 percent level) for these
coeﬃcients from the regressions. Graphs for electronic ﬁling show estimates for the whole
population, the 0-30K, 0-10K and 10-30K category. There is a clear pattern of the eﬀect
at time zero for both 10-30K and 0-30K categories, and although conﬁdence intervals are
generally large (unsurprisingly, restricting instead lags to zero and leads to be equal to each
other as in our tables increases precision of estimates), many of the post treatment dum-
mies are marginally signiﬁcant at the 90 percent level. The number of electronic ﬁlers in
the period prior to the implementation is constant and statistically indistinguishable from
zero.
Similar patterns are evident in Figures 6a and 6b, which plot EITC claims around
program implementation. Despite relatively wide conﬁdence intervals, the pattern of an
48We found some evidence that the eﬀect is stronger for smaller states.
49Because the denominator represents the sum of ﬁlers in all income categories, the presence of new ﬁlers
increases the denominator and, if the number of non-recipients of EITC stays constant, it should decrease
their share.
22increase in EITC claims following time zero is visible for the 10-30K category and, somewhat
less clearly, for the 0-30K category. There is no evidence of a similar response for either the
0-10K category or the non-EITC participants. These ﬁgures substantiate the main result
of our analysis: the introduction of electronic state income tax ﬁling programs resulted in
more people claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit.
In Tables 6a and 6b we present a few additional speciﬁcation checks. A few major events
aﬀecting the low-income individuals took place in the 1990s. The EITC was expanded twice
during the 1990s and in 1996 the welfare system was overhauled. Aggregate changes such as
the expansions of the EITC in 1991 and 1994 should be in principle captured by year eﬀects.
We test whether it is so. EITC beneﬁts were increased as of 1991. The ﬁrst column shows
our speciﬁcation estimated using observations starting in 1991. Despite reduced number
of observations, the estimated coeﬃcients on e-ﬁling and EITC claims remain signiﬁcant
and of similar magnitude as those estimated using the whole sample.50 The following two
columns present two attempts to control for the impact of the 1996 welfare reform. States
designed their own programs meeting TANF requirements between September of 1996 and
March of 1997. These changes likely aﬀected labor supply and participation and therefore
EITC eligibility of low income individuals (Blank, 2002). These eﬀects were state-speciﬁc
and therefore may not be appropriately controlled for by year ﬁxed eﬀects. We re-estimate
our baseline speciﬁcation on the pre-1997 observations (column 2) and, as an alternative, we
include the interactions of state ﬁxed eﬀects with the post-1996 dummy that are supposed
to control for state-speciﬁc shifts in the number of eligible EITC claimants (column 3).
Neither of these changes aﬀected our estimates. Finally, Schoeni and Blank (2000) argue
that state-speciﬁc welfare waivers passed in the early 1990s aﬀected labor force participation
and that the incremental impact of the 1996 reform was small. We have re-estimated our
speciﬁcations while controlling for the pre-1997 presence of a state waiver (column 4). Our
results were virtually unaﬀected even though the state waiver dummy had an eﬀect on EITC
participation but not on e-ﬁling. The introduction of waivers is a relevant consideration for
studying EITC participation, but appears orthogonal to the introduction of state e-ﬁling
changes.
Two major EITC-related events took place in 1994: the program was expanded and the
IRS undertook eﬀorts to reduce cheating. In particular, the IRS began to require that tax-
payers include the Social Security number of a qualifying child and reduced its cooperation
with tax preparers. There is anecdotal evidence that this change signiﬁcantly reduced the
number of (fraudulent) EITC claims, although no strong eﬀect on EITC participation can
be detected in Table 1a. However, as discussed earlier, this change signiﬁcantly aﬀected the
number of e-ﬁlers.
50This speciﬁcation also addresses an earlier concern regarding the existence of a number of zeros in the
early years of the sample, since all but one occur before 1991. In another speciﬁcation that we do not report
in the table, we dropped all the cells that have a value of zero and this change also did not aﬀect our main
ﬁndings.
23Since both of these events are aggregate, the inclusion of year ﬁxed eﬀects should in
principle control for their impact.51 In addition we pursue two additional speciﬁcation
checks. In column 5 we allow for state-speciﬁc pre-1994 dummies to allow for a ﬂexible
regime change in 1994. This change has a relatively minor impact on our estimates. In
column 6, we allow for the interaction of the treatment dummy with a pre-1994 dummy to
allow for the possibility of a change in the eﬀect of treatment. Given that many opportunities
for tax evasion were eliminated in 1994, one might expect that the eﬀect of the treatment is
stronger pre-1994 if tax evasion was an important part of the response. The interaction is
always insigniﬁcant and, if anything, it has a negative impact on EITC participation.52 This
speciﬁcation provides little support for the importance of tax evasion in our results (although
it does not eliminate it as an explanation), but it strongly suggests that, despite their
magnitude, the 1994 events are appropriately accounted for in our baseline speciﬁcation.
In column 7 of Tables 6a and 6b we investigate the relevance of another 1994 event. As
a part of the IRS’s anti-fraud policy, the use of the Direct Deposit Indicator was suspended
and IRS cooperation with the tax preparation industry was limited. This policy began to
be relaxed as early as in 1995. As explained earlier, this event increased the riskiness of
RALs and therefore might have led to a reduction in the attractiveness of electronic ﬁling
services. We eliminated 1994 from our sample to test for the importance of this event and
it does not appear to have a quantitatively important eﬀect. We interpret it as indicating
that year eﬀects appropriately control for this event (i.e., that its impact did not vary in a
way that’s correlated with our treatment).
In column 8 we run our basic speciﬁcation by deﬁning treatment solely on whether
and when a state introduced the Federal/State Electronic Filing Program. As mentioned
earlier, we initially deﬁned our treatment date as the year when a state ﬁrst introduced
any state electronic ﬁling program. While for most states the ﬁrst such program was the
Federal/State Electronic Filing Program implemented in a uniform way in collaboration with
the IRS, a number of states (California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts and Minnesota)
ﬁrst introduced their own independent programs separate from the IRS, while Maine’s
ﬁrst state electronic income tax ﬁling program was TeleFiling. The results, based on these
particular IRS sponsored programs that arguably did not diﬀer across states, are again very
similar to the other columns of the tables. In column 9, we control for the presence of a
state level EITC program and it appears to have no eﬀect on federal EITC claims. Finally,
in column 10 we control for the possibility of TeleFiling which is an alternative to electronic
ﬁling by a tax preparer. Returns ﬁled through TeleFile are included in our measure of e-ﬁling
and TeleFiling could only be used for non-complicated returns and did not allow for claiming
51We attempted splitting the sample in 1994. These results were insigniﬁcant with point estimates that
were diﬀerent from our baseline for both subsamples. However, both of them are based on only six years of
data and, furthermore, few states were treated post-1994.
52The negative sign is consistent with the possibility that the lower number of e-ﬁlers pre-1994 corresponds
to a weaker eﬀect of the introduction of state e-ﬁling on EITC claims pre-1994.
24EITC. States were introducing their own TeleFiling programs throughout the 1990s, but
usually much later than their regular e-ﬁling programs. By 1995 only 3 states had the
program in place and 11 states were yet to implement the program in 2001. Unsurprisingly,
but very consistently with our story, we ﬁnd that TeleFiling aﬀects the number of returns
ﬁled electronically. It does not however aﬀect the number of EITC claims — an expected
ﬁnding given that TeleFiling cannot be used by taxpayers with dependents, who are the
only ones eligible for EITC in the 10-30K income category.
In other robustness tests (not shown in the paper), we dropped particular years or states
from our sample and found the main results unaﬀected by these changes. We also included
state labor force participation rates, the unemployment rate, the logarithm of employment
and crime rates as dependent variables and found no evidence that they respond to the
timing of state e-ﬁling programs. This provides an added comfort that we are not picking
up the eﬀect of some omitted variable that aﬀected state socio-economic conditions in a
way correlated with the timing of our treatment.
In Table 7, we present a number of additional speciﬁcations intended to verify if the
pattern of increases in EITC claims is consistent with the electronic ﬁling story. To do
so, we divide EITC recipients using two criteria: whether one used electronic ﬁling and
whether a professional prepared the tax return. Any of these four categories is possible.
One should be reminded here that the electronic ﬁling with a self-prepared return category
still corresponds to using a tax professional. In fact, such behavior is very common and
one could argue that this type of ﬁling behavior should be most appealing to low income
individuals who want to minimize their cost but are interested in a quick refund. Our data
does not contain information about using a paid tax preparer for 1989 and 1990, and in
1988 there were very few e-ﬁlers; therefore, once the group of e-ﬁlers is split by the tax
preparation status, we end up with many zeros. Therefore, we pursue this analysis starting
with 1991.
The estimates for electronic ﬁling and EITC based on this restricted sample which starts
in 1991 are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 and are very close to those based on the
full sample. In the following two columns of this table (3 and 4) we conﬁrm that the whole
growth in EITC claims is due to e-ﬁlers. This provides further evidence consistent with
interpreting our estimates as the causal eﬀect of changes in state electronic ﬁling programs.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 we decompose the eﬀects by tax preparation status. There
is some evidence that the main source of growth in EITC claims are taxpayers who do not
rely on a paid tax preparer to ﬁll out their tax return. As discussed earlier, this category
includes taxpayers who are choosing to only ﬁle electronically and who are an essential part
of our story. The remaining four columns present further decomposition by splitting the
sample four-ways. There is statistically signiﬁcant evidence (in columns 7 of Table 7) of
the growth in EITC claims for the professional-help and e-ﬁling group. Not surprisingly,
in column 8 of the same table, the number of taxpayers who use a paid tax preparer but
choose not to ﬁle electronically appears to decline (although the estimates are insigniﬁcant
25in both speciﬁcations), suggesting that the introduction of state ﬁling programs also might
have had an eﬀect on how the existing customers of paid tax preparers ﬁle their taxes. The
estimate of an increase in the number of taxpayers who e-ﬁle and self-prepare their tax
returns is positive but insigniﬁcant. In the ﬁnal column of Table 7, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant evidence of an increase in EITC claims among taxpayers who ﬁle taxes fully on
their own.
If one took the (insigniﬁcant) coeﬃcient of 0.225 in the share speciﬁcation seriously, a
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the spill-over eﬀect (the informational/network
eﬀect on taxpayers who learn about EITC but do not use a paid professional) was approx-
imately 0.225/0.752 ≈ 30%.53
6 Discussion
6.1 The source of new claims
While our analysis so far has focused mainly on identifying the eﬀect on electronic ﬁling
and EITC claims of the introduction of state electronic ﬁling, we did not address a number
of questions that are crucial for the understanding and interpretation of our results: (1)
Are they new ﬁlers of taxes or regular ﬁlers of taxes who did not claim EITC before? (2)
More generally, who are the new EITC claimers? (3) Are the new ﬁlers from families who
qualify for the program but for some reason did not claim the beneﬁts they were entitled
to, or are they simply part of the potentially large number of cheaters who did not comply
with the eligibility criteria of the program?
We have seen before that there is no evidence of a reduction in the number of EITC
recipients in response to state electronic ﬁling programs. The direct way of testing whether
the new EITC claimers are also new to ﬁling federal taxes is to run our regression analysis
using the number of people ﬁling. Simultaneously, this approach will allow us to address the
possibility of a behavioral response resulting in shifting across categories. Table 8 contains
the results of this exercise. The results are somewhat imprecise but supportive of the
hypothesis that the increase corresponds to new ﬁlers. The number of total tax recipients
in the 10-30K category increases by 3%, and is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that the whole growth in claims is due to increased ﬁling
by non-ﬁlers: given that the number of EITC recipients in this category varied between
twenty-one and twenty-six percent during the period and given the baseline estimate of the
impact on EITC participation of 12.6%, the corresponding increase in the number of tax
returns if all EITC claims are external should be between 2.6% and 3.3%.
There is also no evidence of a decrease in the number of ﬁlers in the 0-10K category
53We also estimated the dynamics of the responses by category using speciﬁcations with leads and lags.
Estimates for these speciﬁcations were imprecise but not showing any evidence of pre-trends that would
suggest a misspeciﬁcation.
26refuting the possibility that the whole growth in EITC claims was just driven by the response
of lower income individuals motivated by the possibility of obtaining higher EITC beneﬁts
and shifting to the 10-30K category. As a consistency check, there is also no evidence
that the number of returns for taxpayers with incomes above the EITC phase-out limit
responded to our treatment. The estimates based on the share speciﬁcation are insigniﬁcant
but consistent with the ones based on logs. These results do not exclude the possibility that
there was indeed some behavioral response stimulated by the increased awareness of EITC
due to the introduction of electronic ﬁling opportunities. The 10-20K category contains
the region where beneﬁts are maximized. As a result, it is possible that claims increased
for non-ﬁlers who would belong to either of the three income categories, but that these
non-ﬁlers simultaneously responded by adjusting their incomes so that they fall into the
maximum beneﬁt range.
The diﬀerence between the share estimates for the 10-30K category (approximately 0.6)
in Table 3 and the total eﬀect on EITC claims (approximately 0.9), measures the number
of new EITC recipients who used to ﬁle their tax returns: the diﬀerence is about 0.3 and
it is 1/3 of the total increase in EITC claims. Given the lack of precision of estimates in
Table 3 this is only suggestive of the size of this type of response.
6.2 Cheating
Any increase in participation may be reﬂective of increased cheating. There are two diﬀerent
margins on which cheating could operate. Cheaters may have come from either the pool
of ﬁlers or the pool of non-ﬁlers. Certain types of cheating by usual ﬁlers have observable
implications. Claiming ineligible children is the major source of noncompliance (Holtzblatt
and McCubbin, 2003). It may increase the number of children reported on the tax returns.
Another important aspect of non-compliance involves changing ﬁling status. For example,
ﬁling separately from the spouse as single or head of household (married ﬁling separately
are not eligible for EITC) in many cases would lead to an increase in the EITC beneﬁts,
but this is illegal. Nevertheless, to the extent that it takes place, one would expect, ceteris
paribus, a decrease in the number of joint ﬁlers.
We have already attempted two speciﬁcation checks related to cheating in Tables 6a
and 6b: we found no evidence of a diﬀerential eﬀect surrounding or following the 1994
change in enforcement policies. However, this is not a deﬁnitive ﬁnding, because it is
possible that these changes had a relatively uniform eﬀect on tax fraud regardless of the
treatment status of the states.
We attempt to shed further light on the importance of cheating. In Table 9 we con-
centrate on the possibility of adjusting marital status in order to claim higher beneﬁts. In
the ﬁrst column we compare estimates for the total number of returns with the estimates
for the total number of people constructed by double-counting joint tax returns. If there is
cheating by manipulation of the ﬁling status, we would expect the number of returns to in-
27crease by more than the number of people. In the extreme case the number of people could
stay constant with the number of returns increasing. We ﬁnd no such evidence: estimates
for the number of returns and the number of bodies are indistinguishable. In the following
three columns we decompose the change in the number of returns into the response of dif-
ferent ﬁling categories to see if there are possible compositional shifts. The only category
that appears to be strongly responding are heads of households (although estimates are not
statistically signiﬁcant), while none of the other coeﬃcients is negative. Therefore, there is
little support for the possibility that taxpayers adjusted their ﬁling status to claim higher
beneﬁts. The following three columns show the results for the EITC recipients only. There
is evidence there that there was a signiﬁcant growth in both the number of joint ﬁlers and
heads of household. There is no similar evidence for single EITC recipients, but it should
be noted that this group is somewhat peculiar: single (non head-of-household) ﬁlers can
receive EITC while in the 10-30K income category only if they have qualifying children.
Therefore, these are taxpayers who claim qualifying children for EITC purposes but not a
dependent exemption. One might have expected that cheaters would pursue this path, but
there is no evidence that this actually happened.
The comparison of estimates for the number of returns and the number of recipients by
marital status categories is revealing. While the number of EITC recipients who are jointly
ﬁling increases, the total number of joint ﬁlers does not. Given no evidence of endogenous
changes in marital status, it suggests therefore that the new jointly ﬁling EITC recipients
used to ﬁle in the past. This is in contrast to the estimates for heads of households: there is
a similar increase in the total number of taxpayers claiming this status and in the number
of EITC recipients that claim it. As a result, it appears that the EITC response may in fact
reﬂect both increased ﬁling and learning by existing ﬁlers: the ﬁrst eﬀect applies to singles
with children while the latter is the domain of joint ﬁlers.
In Table 10 we investigate the possibility of cheating by claiming non-qualifying children.
The ideal measure for this purpose would be the number of qualifying children for EITC
purposes, but this measure is not available in our data. As mentioned earlier, diﬀerent
qualifying criteria are used for EITC and tax exemption purposes. Nevertheless, if there is
systematic and large scale over-reporting of ineligible children we might expect this to be
accompanied by overstating dependent exemptions as well.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 10, we investigate the eﬀect of the treatment on the total
number of child exemptions. It is somewhat imprecisely estimated but relatively large
(and borderline signiﬁcant in the log speciﬁcation). The relevant reference point for this
coeﬃcient is the increase in the number of tax returns reported in Table 9. The comparison
of the points estimates in the share speciﬁcation suggests that the number of children
increases by slightly more than the number of tax returns. In other words, the additional
ﬁlers appear to have on average slightly more than one child. The log speciﬁcations suggest
that the number of children increases at the rate twice as large as the number of returns.
The following two columns show the impact on the number of children by the EITC
28status. These results might be interpreted as suggesting that the increased EITC partic-
ipation involved some reshuﬄing of children, potentially corresponding to cheating. The
estimated increase in the total number of children of EITC recipients is of the order of 1% of
the total number of returns. This estimate is higher than the increase in the total number
of child exemptions and, correspondingly, we observe a negative coeﬃcient on the number
of children among the non-EITC recipients. Recall that the total number of non-EITC
recipients decreased slightly in the share speciﬁcation and was ﬂat in the log speciﬁcation
(Table 5). A decrease in the number of children of non-EITC recipients would have to then
correspond to shifting of children to EITC recipients. Even though this is suggestive of
possible cheating, all of these estimates are insigniﬁcant and small relative to the increase
in the number of children among EITC recipients.
Our evidence on cheating can be summarized as follows. We did not ﬁnd any evidence
of cheating by adjusting the marital status. However, the decomposition by marital status
allowed us to conclude that heads of households are the main pool of nonﬁlers contributing
to increased EITC participation. We also ﬁnd some evidence of a smaller but statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on participation of joint ﬁlers who used to ﬁle their tax returns. We
also investigated whether there is any evidence of cheating by manipulating the number of
reported children. There is very weak evidence that the number of children of non-EITC
recipients decreases somewhat even though the number of non-EITC recipients is stable
(in the log speciﬁcation). This is suggestive of potential shifting of children from non-
EITC recipients to EITC recipients. However these results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Stressing this caveat, the point estimates would imply that 1/3 of newly reported tax
exemptions by EITC recipients are for children who would have been claimed by someone
on a tax return anyway. Recalling, however, that we have already seen that there is a
weak evidence of the existence of a group of joint ﬁlers who used to ﬁle and yet did not
apply for the EITC before state electronic ﬁling programs were introduced, the reduction
in the number of children by non EITC recipients may be simply due to this group of ﬁlers
changing EITC status.
In the last three columns of Table 10, we split the sample of EITC recipients by the
number of children. We ﬁnd that the new claimants are mostly taxpayers with only one
child. We conclude therefore by observing that a typical new EITC participant is a single
taxpayer with one child ﬁling as a head of household who used not to ﬁle before, arguably
the type of person that government programs are trying to reach. While these ﬁndings
imply that, based on the available observable characteristics, the new ﬁlers of EITC claims
are fairly similar to existing ﬁlers, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that a portion
of these new ﬁlers are in fact cheaters who did not comply with the criteria of the federal
EITC program.
297 Conclusions and Implications
Our analysis provided evidence that the introduction of electronic ﬁling led to an increase in
EITC participation. We demonstrated this link by showing that the increase in both federal
electronic ﬁling and EITC participation was much stronger in states that introduced the
possibility of electronic ﬁling of state income tax returns. Furthermore, we suggest that
this eﬀect have been driven by a response of the tax preparation industry. In our analysis
we provided a large number of speciﬁcation checks to test the robustness of the results and
to rule out competing explanations, such as other welfare, EITC and IRS related reforms
implemented during the 1990’s.
Additionally, we ﬁnd that increased EITC participation draws mostly from the pool of
non-ﬁlers: individuals who otherwise would not ﬁle their tax returns. We do not ﬁnd any
major evidence suggesting that cheating is an important part of the eﬀects that we estimate.
While fraud certainly still exists in the system, it does not appear that cheating was further
stimulated by state electronic ﬁling opportunities.
We make three additional observations that follow from our results. First, while our
results point to a potential beneﬁt of the decentralized tax preparation industry, the use of
RAL’s and the role of tax preparation industry remain controversial, because they reduce
the actual beneﬁts received by low-income individuals. We do not provide any evidence
related to the costs of their activity, but only point out that these costs should be eval-
uated against beneﬁts from increased participation and the costs of alternative means of
providing information about EITC, such as government-sponsored outreach eﬀorts.54 A full
evaluation of the role of the tax preparation industry would require additional information,
such as medium and long term responses within the tax preparation industry, the change
of eligibility criteria over time as well as the size and composition of uninformed taxpayers.
Second, the results illustrate that complexity is a serious issue in the program and
tax design. More precise targeting of beneﬁts requires increased complexity, but increased
complexity will make it less likely that intended recipients would be able to beneﬁt. In this
sense, concerns about complexity (separately from traditional eﬃciency arguments) may
limit the extent of eﬀective redistribution. On the positive side, our results suggest that
such trade-oﬀs are likely sensitive to institutional and technological environments that are
subject to change.
Finally, our analysis provides a cautionary note to the studies that rely on repeated
cross-sections of taxpayers. We found that it is not prudent to assume that taxpayers in
every year are drawn from the same distribution. In particular, our results suggest that
during the 1990s the lower end of the distribution of individuals who are captured by tax
statistics expanded.
54See Aizer (2004) for the evidence of eﬀectiveness of state-run outreach and advertising campaigns in the
context of Medicaid.
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32Table 1a: EITC, E-Filers and Professionally Prepared Returns by Income Group and Year
% EITC % E-ﬁlers % Professionally
Prepared Return
Total 0-10K 10-30K >30K Total 0-10K 10-30K >30K Total 0-10K 10-30K >30K
1988 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.47 0.34 0.45 0.57
1989 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03
1990 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.06
1991 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.49 0.40 0.48 0.55
1992 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.55
1993 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.55
1994 0.17 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.55
1995 0.17 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.56
1996 0.17 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.56
1997 0.16 0.31 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.13 0.52 0.44 0.52 0.57
1998 0.16 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.17 0.53 0.45 0.53 0.57
1999 0.15 0.30 0.26 0.00 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.23 0.54 0.47 0.55 0.58
Table 1b: E-ﬁling and Professionally Prepared Returns among EITC recipients




Total 0-10K 10-30K Total 0-10K 10-30K Total 0-10K 10-30K
1988 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.43 0.39 0.45 0.03 0.03 0.02
1989 0.13 0.11 0.13
1990 0.25 0.24 0.24
1991 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.23 0.24 0.21
1992 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.27 0.26 0.25
1993 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.29 0.26 0.28
1994 0.26 0.19 0.30 0.52 0.46 0.56 0.19 0.14 0.22
1995 0.29 0.25 0.30 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.21 0.19 0.22
1996 0.36 0.33 0.37 0.57 0.53 0.60 0.28 0.24 0.30
1997 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.34 0.30 0.35
1998 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.62 0.57 0.65 0.37 0.33 0.39
1999 0.54 0.49 0.56 0.67 0.63 0.69 0.45 0.40 0.47
Notes: Tables are based on authors’ calculations based on the Tax Model Files issued by the Statistics of Income
division of the IRS.
33Table 1c: Summary Statistics, by State (1988-1999)
Year of % of returns in % of returns with
State EFI Teleﬁle StateFed 0-10K 10-30K EITC E-ﬁle Prof. help
AL 1997 none 1997 25.70 38.09 23.56 18.71 52.58
AK no tax no tax no tax 40.46 23.38 8.06 8.93 40.03
AZ 1997 none 1997 22.15 37.85 16.45 12.69 53.32
AR 1994 1997 1994 24.92 41.34 21.57 16.72 57.33
CA 1994 1996 never 21.33 34.02 15.22 7.88 57.00
CO 1993 none 1993 20.32 32.96 11.15 11.05 50.09
CT 1993 1998 1993 19.88 30.98 7.69 9.95 46.04
DE 1993 1999 1993 18.33 33.21 11.39 12.04 42.40
DC 1996 2000 1996 14.75 42.45 14.13 12.20 42.21
FL no tax no tax no tax 22.73 38.86 15.52 15.80 50.03
GA 1994 2001 1994 22.24 36.17 19.05 18.58 51.41
HI 2001 none 2001 19.78 36.82 8.07 7.18 53.31
ID 1993 1999 1993 26.37 40.44 17.31 12.11 48.05
IL 1990 1993 1995 23.28 32.28 12.18 14.44 51.25
IN 1992 1999 1992 22.75 33.51 11.76 18.33 50.44
IA 1993 none 1993 23.90 35.28 9.00 13.30 62.74
KS 1991 1996 1991 23.31 33.63 12.18 14.15 57.94
KY 1992 1999 1992 24.60 36.79 15.53 17.75 55.68
LA 1992 1996 1992 25.38 38.04 24.75 17.90 49.72
ME 2000 1996 never 24.25 37.07 10.03 10.82 39.04
MD 1990 2001 1995 19.64 32.59 11.23 11.19 44.98
MA 1992 1995 never 21.05 32.00 7.41 9.58 47.48
MI 1992 1999 1992 23.88 31.56 10.87 12.51 50.03
MN 1989 1998 never 23.69 32.56 7.87 10.70 50.85
MS 1992 1995 1992 25.11 43.19 30.53 20.27 47.46
MO 1993 1997 1993 24.80 35.70 14.59 15.17 56.55
MT 1994 1997 1994 26.53 39.35 13.59 13.08 57.38
NE 1993 1998 1993 23.03 35.44 12.05 10.67 57.30
NV no tax no tax no tax 18.28 39.43 13.80 13.56 50.24
NH no tax no tax no tax 21.56 31.40 7.71 13.00 40.62
NJ 1994 1996 1994 19.72 29.98 10.20 9.48 53.77
NM 1992 none 1992 28.54 36.45 24.44 16.88 49.66
NY 1992 none 1992 21.22 33.76 12.59 8.76 55.78
NC 1991 none 1991 23.27 38.21 17.08 17.48 51.89
ND 1999 none 1999 23.91 36.01 9.15 10.71 60.88
OH 1999 1997 1999 23.11 36.02 10.72 14.01 48.11
OK 1992 2001 1992 24.52 38.56 16.97 14.30 57.54
OR 1993 2001 1993 20.15 35.27 10.16 8.22 47.71
PA 1995 1998 1995 23.29 35.36 10.56 10.28 45.35
RI 1994 none 1994 20.35 34.59 11.31 10.35 50.88
SC 1990 1997 1990 24.99 40.63 19.78 23.78 53.33
SD no tax no tax no tax 25.74 40.26 11.92 14.99 50.58
TN no tax no tax no tax 24.65 37.48 18.57 20.01 49.23
TX no tax no tax no tax 24.93 36.70 19.94 16.67 45.33
UT 1992 1998 1992 21.94 34.52 11.22 11.90 45.62
VT 2001 none 2001 24.95 32.37 10.79 6.72 43.37
VA 1994 2000 1994 19.90 33.35 11.27 13.29 43.85
WA no tax no tax no tax 19.36 32.52 9.24 11.50 42.33
WV 1991 2001 1991 23.92 40.57 17.04 14.57 42.33
WI 1991 1998 1991 23.37 34.56 9.71 12.63 48.97
WY no tax no tax no tax 25.80 35.03 9.59 16.07 50.89
Total 23.17 35.66 13.94 13.07 50.84
Notes: The ﬁrst three columns refer to the date of the introduction of the ﬁrst state electronic ﬁling program (State





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46Figure 1: EITC, Electronic Filing, Self-Prepared Returns — aggregate
year
 Share of electronic filers  Share of EITC recipients
 Share using prof. help  Share prof. help or e−file












Source: Author’s calculations based on the Tax Model Files issued by the Statistics of Income division of the IRS.
Figure 2: Electronic Filing and Professionally Prepared Returns, EITC recipients, 10-30K
year
 Prof. help, efiling  Prof. help, no efiling
 No pref. help, efiling   No prof. help, no efiling








Source: Author’s calculations based on the Tax Model Files issued by the Statistics of Income division of the IRS.





























































Source: The date of the introduction of a state e-ﬁling program is taken from Table 1c. The non-participation rate
is for 1996 and taken from Internal Revenue Service (2002).




























































Source: The date of the introduction of a state e-ﬁling program is taken from Table 1c. The percent of EITC
recipients in 1989 is based on the author’s calculations based on the Tax Model Files issued by the Statistics of










































































































































































Notes: The ﬁgures show the coeﬃcients from a version of equation 2 that includes both leads and lags, as well as
state-speciﬁc trends. The ﬁgures also show the 95% conﬁdence intervals constructed using the bootstrap technique










































































































































































Notes: The ﬁgures show the coeﬃcients from a version of equation 2 that includes both leads and lags, as well as
state-speciﬁc trends. The ﬁgures also show the 90% conﬁdence intervals constructed using the bootstrap technique
(pointwise). 50